Bargaining Power and Market Tightness: Theory and Evidence
Worker bargaining power is central to wage determination and varies substantially across countries, across worker types, and over time. Yet, standard models treat it as an exogenous fixed parameter, leaving the observed variation in bargaining power largely unexplained. This paper endogenises bargaining power and shows, in theory and in the data, that it is an equilibrium object shaped by labour market tightness. I develop a non-cooperative alternating-offers model in which workers and firms continue to search while negotiating. In equilibrium, a negotiation's breakdown risk depends on market conditions, so the worker's surplus share rises with tightness. Using an instrumental variables approach and French matched employer–employee data, I test this prediction by estimating how the pass-through of firm productivity to wages varies with local labour market tightness. The results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in tightness raises productivity pass-through to wages by 16%. I further study how this relationship varies across firms of different sizes and productivity levels.
Presented at (including scheduled): SAEe 2026, Fourth Women in Central Banking Workshop, 41st AIEL Conference, EALE 2026