Tuna Dökmeci

This paper develops a non-cooperative microfoundation for generalised Nash bargaining weights in frictional matching markets. I study an alternating-offers wage bargaining game in which agents can continue searching while negotiating and endogenously decide whether to abandon an ongoing bargain when a new partner arrives. In equilibrium, these attendance decisions generate endogenous breakdown risk that depends on market tightness. Under standard matching technologies, more favourable market conditions strengthen a party’s bargaining power. In the frictionless limit, equilibrium outcomes can converge to monopoly or monopsony allocations under additional assumptions on first-mover probabilities.

This paper studies the effect of young adults' job insecurity on the consumption and labour supply decisions of their parents. Using data from the Italian Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), we causally estimate this effect by exploiting a labour market reform ("Fornero reform") that substantially reduced firing costs for workers in firms with more than 15 employees. According to our findings, working parents of treated adult children reduced their consumption by €2,453 per year on average. This effect is driven by the drop in durable consumption, which yearly decreases by €1,600. Even if we do not find any substantial and significant effect on the intensive and extensive margins of labour, we observe that the impact on consumption is stronger for retired parents who are constrained in their ability to adjust their labour supply and who also reduce their non-durable expenditures.

In this paper, I analyse the effects of firing costs on job creation and employment in an oligopolistic setting. I show that quantity competition and strategic interaction can generate a positive relationship between firing costs and hiring. The mechanism relies on commitment: when firms face costly lay-offs, they can credibly commit to higher output, discouraging rivals from expanding. However, this effect is not monotonic. At low levels, firing costs limit commitment and deter hiring; at higher levels, they enable firms to lead the market and expand employment. The model also reveals strategic spillovers, as firms respond not only to their own constraints but also to their competitors'. These results challenge the standard view that firing costs necessarily suppress job creation and highlight the importance of market structure in shaping labour market outcomes.